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Petition to Review an
Orde,r of the
Public Service Commission of Utah
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY,
Suite 300, 65 South Main Street
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Attorneys for Plaintiff.
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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
~'HE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
'V 11~STFJRN R A I L R 0 AD COMPANY, a corporation,

Plailnt~ff,

v.
Pl. TBLTC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF lTTAH and STATE ROAD COM~II~~ION

OF UTAH,

~

I

Case No.
9727

Defendants.

PLAINTIF'F'S BRIEF
STATEMEN·T OF TIRE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to review an order of the defendant
Public Service Commission of Utah requiring plaintiff
The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company
to contribute ten per cent of the cost of erecting a highway structure on U. S. Highway 6-50, overpassing a
railroad industry spur designated as Gomex Spur in
Utah County, Utah.
DISPOSITION BEFORE T'HE PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION OF U'TAH
The proceeding was heard before defendant Public
Service Commission of rtah on the petition of defendant
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2
State Road Commission of Utah 1n which proceeding
defendant Public Service Commission of Utah ordered
plaintiff to contribute ten per cent of the cost of the
overpass structure. Plaintiff brings the matter before
this Court on petition to review said order.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON R-EVIEW
Plaintiff seeks to have the order of defendant Publjc
Service Commission of Utah set aside.

STATEMENT' OF FACTS
1

In this brief the parties will for convenience be
designated as follows : Plaintiff as "Rio Grande;'' defendant Public Service Commission of Utah as "Public
Service Commission;" and defendant State Road Commission of Utah as "State Road Commission.''
State Road Commission is engaged in a project for
the widening of U. S. Highway 6-50 in Utah County,
Utah. A portion of such project includes the area where
said highway departs from the confines of Spanish Fnl"k
Canyon and running in a northwesterly direction enters
the Utah Valley. In this area the· main line of Rio Grande
is located southerly of said highway and roughly parallel
thereto (R. 1-11, 86). In 1940, Illinois Powder Company
established a plant near the base of the Wasatch Mount-ains northerly of both said highway and Rio Grande's
main line. This plant, together ·with its appurtenant rail
facilities, is now owned by American Cyanamid Company. The plant established by Illinois Powder Company
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3
and prp::;ently mnwd by American Cyanamid Company

i 14 lo<'ntP(l in ~Pdion 34, Township 8 South, Range 3
11:n~t, Nalt IJakP ~leridian. At the time of the establishtmmt of this plant, Rio Grande conveyed to the Powder
Colllpany all of its interest in the northeast quarter of
tlw southeast quarter of said Section 34, except for the
owlH.'r~hip of the right of way for its main line, (R. 64-71)
and under date of 1\farch 20, 1940, entered into a trackage agreetnent with the Powder Company (R. 9·2-95, Ex.
6). This agreement provides for the construction at the
expense of the Powder Company of certain spur trackagt' connecting into the main line of Rio Grande· in the
southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of said Section
:l-t: and extending northwesterly a distance of 3,873 feet.
Tradmge northerly of the forty-acre· line running east
and west through the center of the southeast quarter of
::;aid Section 34, under said agreement, became the property of the Powder Company and trackage south of such
forty-acre line became the property of Rio Grande. In
its portion of the trackage the Powder Company owned
the roadbed, the ties, rails and fastenings, bridge and
building material, and Rio Grande had no right, title or
interest in said trackage or the materials constituting
the same. Rio Grande was denied any right of way over
the property of the Powder Company and also denried
the right to use the trackage on the Powder Company
property for its own business or for the business of any
other shipper and prevented from extending such trackage to serve any other industry. The agreement further
provides that the traakage should be operated only so
long as the business of the Powder Company justified
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such operation, and that trackage owned by the Powder
Company should be maintained at its expense, and should
it fail to do so, Rio Grande might disconnect such
trackage from its rails ( R. 92-95, Ex. 6).
The spur track in question was constructed and is
now operated pursuant to this agreement. As shown by
R. 86, Ex. 2, there is doubt as to the true location of
said forty-acre line, two lines being shown, one designated as "40 acre line," the other as "40 acre line as
located by Utah Railway Company." No evidence being
introduced showing how Utah Railway Company unde,rtook to establish the line, it is assumed for the purpose
of this brief that the other line is accurately located.
Movements of traffic into and out from the American Cyanamid plant are handled by Rio Grande switch
crews operating out of Provo. No regular schedules are
employed but the traffic is moved on an "on call" basis.
About two trips each week or about eight trips each
month are made to the plant. No other industries whatever are served over this spur and none may he served
under the provisions of the trackage agreement (R. 52-59,
R. 91, Ex. 5, R. 92-95, Ex. 6).
By reference to the print attached to the trackage
agreement (R. 95, Ex. 6) and the State Road Commission
Map (R. 86, Ex. 2) it is seen that the ownership of Rio
Grande terminates at said forty-acre line, that the spur
track in question intersects the center line of the existing
highway approximately at the point where said track
crosses said forty-acre line, and that the proposed structure (outlined in pencil) will be located astride said
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fortv -acre line, being partly on the property of Rio
Grande and partly on the property of American Cyanamid Company, the ext~nt to which such structure
occupies the property of either company depending upon
the true location of said forty-acre line.
Trains moving cars into and out from the Cyanamid

Plant are stopped prior to entering the crossing and the
train is flagged over the crossing by members of the
train crew. There has never been a recorded accident
at the rrossing (R. 52-59).
The usual practice of Rio Grande under its operating
rulP8 in the Salt Lal\:e District, in the absence of other
crossing protection, is to protect movements across highways on industry spurs by train crews flagging the
movement across the highway (R. 62).

ARGUMEN·T
POINT I.
THE POWER AND· JURISDIOTION OF THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
DOES NOT· EXTE.ND TO ·THE· APPORTIONMENT OF THE COSTS OF A GRAD·E
SEPAR.ATION OVER T~ HE RAILROAD
SPUR TRACK INVOLVED IN THIS CASE.
The Public Service Commission is a statutory creature of the State of Utah, deriving its power from the
legislature. It has no inherent power, and the source of
such power as it undertakes to exercise must be found in
some statute. Ba.mberger Electric R.R., et .al. v. Public
UtilitZ:es Commission of Utah, 59 Utah 351, 204 Pac. 314;

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

State v. -Nelson, 65 Utah 157, 238 Pae. 237; Logan Gil!! v.
Public Ut1~lities Commission, 77 Utah 442, 296 Pac. 1006;
Garkane Potoer Co. v. Public Se·rvice Commission, 98
Utah 466, 100 P. 2d 571; Coun.ty Water System, et al. v.
Salt Lake City, et al., 3 Utah 2d 46, 278 P. 2d 285.
The jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission
over the subject of highway grade separations is found
in Section 54-4-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
provides as follows:
'' 54-4-15. Grade crossings-Regulation.-(1)
No track of any railroad shall be constructed
across a public road, highway or street at grade,
nor shall the track of any railroad corporation be
constructed across the track of any other railroad or street railroad corporation at grade·, nor
shall the track of a stre·et railroad corporation be
constructed across the track of a railroad corporation at grade, without the permission of the
commission having first been secured; provided,
that this subsection shall not apply to the replacement of lawfully existing tracks. T'he commission shall have the right to refuse its
permission or to grant it upon such terms and
conditions as it may prescribe.
( 2) The commission shall have the exclusive
power to determine and prescribe the manneT,
including the particular point of crossing, and
the terms of installation, operation, maintenance,
use and protection of each crossing of one railroad by another railroad or street railroad, and
of a street railroad by a railroad and of each
crossing of a public road or highway by a railroad
or street railroad, and of a street by a railroad
or vice versa, and to alter or abolish any such
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erossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to
<'Prtnin typ·es of traffic in the interest of public
safety and is vested with power and it shall be its
<lu ty to designate the railroad crossings to be
traversed by school busses and motor vehicles
earrying passengers for hire, ·and to require,
where in its judgment it would he practicable, a
separation of grades at any such crossing heretofore or hereafter established, and to prescribe
the terms upon which such separation shall be
n1ade and the proportions in which the expense
of the alteration or abolition of such crossings or
the separation of such grades shall be divided
between the railroad or street railroad corporations affected, or between such corporations and
the state, county, municipality or other public
authority in interest.
( 3) Whenever the commission shall find
that public convenience and necess~ty demand the
establishment, creation or construction of a crossing of a street or highway over, under or upon
the tracks or lines of any public utility, the commission may by order, decision, rule or decree
require the establishment, construction or creation of such crossing, and such crossing shall
thereupon become a public highway and crossing.
Subsection 2 of the foregoing Section 54-4-15 is controlling. It empowers the Public Service Commission
where in its judgment it would be practical to require a
separation of grades of a railroad over a highway and
to apportion the expense of such separation between the
railroad and the governmental subdivision involved.
The foregoing section does not undertake to define
what shall constitute a "railroad."
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Subsection (9) of Section 54-2-1 defines the tenn
"railroad" as follows:
"(9) The term 'railroad' includes every
commercial, interurban and other railway, other
than a street railway, and each and every branch
or extension thereof, by whatsoever power operated, together with all tracks, bridges, trestles,
rights-of-way, subways, tunnels, stations, depots,
union depots, yards, grounds, terminals, te:rminal
facilities, structures and equipment, and all other
real estate, fixtures and personal prope1rty of
every kind used in connection therewith, owned,
controlled, ·operated or managed for public service in the transportation of persons or property."
Casting aside language not applicable to the case at
bar the controlling provisions appear to be· that "The
term 'railroad' includes . . . all tracks . . . owned, oontrolled, operated or managed for public service in the
transportation of persons or property."
Does the trackage at the point of crossing fall within this definition~ We think not. lllinois Powder Company in the agreement of March 29, 1940, was very
careful to strip Rio Grande of every vestige of ownership
or control of the trackage north of the forty-acre line.
Clearly this trackage was not owned or controlled by Rio
Grande. Nor was this trackage operated or managed for
public service. The Powder Company was careful to
prevent such use. It will be observed that the' form of
trackage agreement employed contains a subdivision entitled "Use, Operation and Extension of Trackage."
Under this subdivision the form prior to signature made
provision for the use by Rio Grande of the trackage for
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its own hu~inP:-;~ and the business of other shippers, and
for the extension of the trackage to serve other shippers.
Provi~ion was also made under another subdivision for
grant of right of way to Rio Grande over the property
of the Powder Company. All these provisions were
stri<'ken out in the instnm1ent as signed by the parties.
Thus the Powder Company made secure its ownership
in the trac·kage and precluded the use of this trackage
hy any other person. By the express limitations of the
ag-reement, trackage within the boundaries of the Powder
l ~ompany property became its own plant facility, to be
operated and managed for its exclusive benefit.
Nor is the portion of the spur from Rio Grande's
main line to the forty-acre line a railroad within the
meaning of the foregoing statute. The clause "tracks ...
owned, controlled, operated or managed for pubJic service
in the transportation of persons or property" is
eonjunetive.
The essential proposition is that any trackage to be
part of a railroad within the meaning of the statute must
be devoted to public service whether by ownership, control, operation or management. Had the Powder Company been willing to sign the trackage agreement in the·
standard form the entire spur in question might thus
have been a part of a railroad within the statutory
definition, for then Rio Grande could have used the spur
for its own business or for that of other shippers, or
could have extended the same to serve others ; being deprived of these possible rights the entire spur, including
the portion thereof within Rio Grande's ownership, is
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available only for the use of a single industry, it is not
available for public service.
In reaching this result, Rio Grande is by no means
seeking to escape Public Service Comnlission jurisdiction
by a device of teehnical statutory construction. The rule
invoked here is fundamental, namely, that Public Service
Commission jurisdiction extends only to activities which
are carried on in public service and to facilities which are
devoted to rendering that service. Such jurisdiction does
not extend to services and facilities of a private nature.
See State v. Nelson, supra, and Bamberger ElectriJc R.R.
v. P~"blic Utilities Commission, supr.a.
POINT II.
THERE IS NO SUBS'TANTIAL I~VIDENCE
SUPPORT A FINDING T'HAT PLAINTIFF WILL B E N E F I T FROM 'THE
CONSTRUCTION OF T'HE HIGHWAY
OVERPASS.

~TO

This review, in the judgment of plaintiff, should be
disposed of under the jurisdictional point considered
above. In urging consideration of the second point, plaintiff does not in any way admit the jurisdiction of the
Public Service Commission and consideration of this
second point is urged upon the assumption of jurisdiction
without in any manner admitting the same.
The Public Service Commission gives no consideration whatever to the peculiar facts, hereinabove considered, surrounding the ownership and operation of the
spur track involved. This Commission treats the case as
though the spur \vere under the ownership and control of
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Hio 0 ramle. Suppose the cro~~ing were all located slightly north of' its present position, and clearly within the
<'x<·lu~ivP ownPr~hip of American Cyanamid; could an
a.dmini8trative body then properly find that a railroad
company, whieh svvitched cars into and out of that protwrty was benefited by the separation of a grade crossing.
\Vould not any benefit under such circumstances be enjny<·d by the public and the industry. The Witness
.Johnson, ralled by the Road Commission, expressed the
viPw that benefit should follow ownership of trackage
(H. -t-:~). If that view were followed it would be· necessary
for the Public Service Comission to determine who owned
the trackage over which the structure would be built.
This the Public Service Commission did not undertake to
do, and because of the uncertainty of the true locatlion of
the forty-acre line, it could not do under the evidence
pr<'~ented.

'rhe real answer to this pro b~em, however, is to be
fotmd in anothet~ approach. The· entire spur track,
whether within railroad or industry ownership, is devoted and necessarily devoted to the use of American
C\anamid Company. It is not a usual or ordinary industry spur. Because of these peculiar facts and circumstances, the spur and its crossing over the highway are
not such as to authorize or require railroad participation
in the cost of the structure.
The rule is now, of course, well established by a
many decisions that a railroad company may, by
~tatute, municipal ordinance, or the order of a regulatory
body having jurisdiction, be required to participate in
the erection of grade separation structures. There are,

~reat
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however, definite limrita.tions upon the, power of the State
or one of its agencies, to impose such obligation upon a
railroad company. The imposition of such burden must
he fair and it must he imposed pursuant to proceedings
which are not arbitrary or unreasonable. Moreover, the
promotion of public convenience, will not justify requiring
of a railroad, any more than of others, the expenditure
of money, unless it can be shown that a duty to provide
the particular convenience rests upon it. See Denver cf
Rio Grande R.R. v. City and County of Denver, et al.,
250 U.S. 241, and Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters,
294 U.S. 405, and many cases there, cited.
Each case depends upon its own facts and circumstances. What may he fair and reasonable under one!
set of circumstances would not be fair and reasonable
under another set of circumstances.
Reviewring again the case involved here, these facts
are pertinent : As shown from the evidence, the movements into and out of the plant in que,stion are conducted
by tramp or switch cretWs operating out of Provo. The
uniform practice pursuant to rule of Rio Grande is that
such trains are stopped before entering the crossing.
The speed of the trains over the crossing is therefore at
a mrinimum. The volume of traffic across the intersection
is light, being shown to be about eight movements into
and out from the plant each month. The crossing is
protected by members of the train crew, who flag the
train across the intersection. This practice has been employed for some twenty-two years and has never resulted
in an accident at the crossing. Moreover, this practice of
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flagging ~nvitch movements over highways to serve in(lnst.ries is one which in the absence of other crossing
protP<·tion i~ regularly and usually employed by Rio
Gran de in the Salt Lake District. The crossing involved
is not in a congested municipal are1a but is in open country
located outside any city or town. If circumstances have
now arisen which in any manner require the separation
of grade at the crossing, these circumstances have arisen
not bPeause of any activity whatever on the part of llio
Grande but because of the increased burden upon the
hig-hway arising from the use therof by persons engaged
in the movement of persons and property ove·r the highway. There is no assurance whatever that the traffic
into and out of the single industrial plant served by this
~pur may continue for any length of time.
The findings of the Public Service Commission aptwar to base railroad benefit on two grounds, namely,
saving in time and removal of hazard. On the subject of
hazard, the record is against the finding. After twentytwo years of traffic over the crossing, no accident has
orrurred. The practice employed in protecting movements over the crossing is in accordance with standard
procedure employed by plaintiff under like cros.sings in
the Salt Lake District. Moreover, if any hazard has
developed at the crossing, such hazard arises solely because of public use of the crossing and not because of any
activity or conduct on the part of Rio Grande. With
respect to the saving of time, the most that can be s·aid
is that some momentary time is saved. There is no evidence that such saving of time would result in any financial or other benefit to Rio Grande. The Public Service
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C01nmission itself observes that it would be difficult
to measure in dollars and cents any benefits which Rio
Grande would enjoy by elimination of the grade crossing.
Rio Grande under the order of the Public Service
Commission will be required to pay something in excess
of $10,000 as its portion of cost of the structure. We
submit that the benefit enjoyed by Rio Grande should be
more than trivial, it should be substantial and cognizable.
The evidence does not disclose such benefit.
The State Road Commission introduced a copy of a
Policy and Procedure Memorandum of the Bureau of
Public Roads, making provision, under certain circumstances, to relieve railroads from the obligation of
contributing to the cost of grade separations over spur
tracks. This memorandum appears not to be applicable
here because the highway is technically not a freeway,
nor is the memorandum binding upon the Public Service
Commission. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the view that
in case of certain spur tracks a railroad may enjoy no
cognizable benefit. This we believe is the circumstance
here.
CONCLUSION
The order of the PubHc Service Commission should
be set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN GOTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCART'HY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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